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Complicating female suicide bombers: 
violence, agency and gender in the rhetoric of shahida 
ABSTRACT 
Since 2002, popular Western news media has become fixated with the "advent" of 
the Palestinian female suicide bomber when a woman named Wafa Idris detonated 
herself on a busy Jaffa Road in Israel. Questions about gender, domesticity, violence, 
subjectivity, and technology arise as researchers, journalists and others confront 
culturally conceived notions about women and their roles in both Islamic and Western 
. ' 
societies. Proposing a broader concept of violence that is cognizant of women's violent 
histories and struggles over agency, this essay suggests that analyses of women and 
violence are incomplete without critically thinking about the "female suicide bomber" -
or shahida-within their contemporary cultural and social context. Yasser Arafat's 
"Army of Roses" speech in 2002 serves as a representative anecdote useful for 
constructing and deconstructing the shahida rhetoric as it is disseminated through global 
news media outlets. Thus, this essay's focus on "female suicide bombers" contends that 
understanding subjectivity and technology as inextricably linked is crucial to the 
development of a more inclusive theory of violence and gender. Shahidas are excellent· 
and perhaps indispensable figures for understanding how rhetoric effects our perceptions 
of gendered roles in society, while providing a broader spectrum for furthering theories 
abo'ut women and violence. 
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J11troductio11 
Complicating female suicide bombers: 
violence, agency and gender in the rhetoric of sltaltida 
"/have to tell the world that if they do not defend 
us, then we have to defend ourselves with the only 
thing we have, our bodies. Our bodies are the only 
fighting means at our disposal. " 
Hiba, 28, mother of five and shahida trainee1 
4 
Female terrorists are all over the news these days. The news media tells us we are 
witnessing a new insurgence of warriors internationally that undermine our perceptions 
and our policies regarding potential threats we face daily (Barr, 2002; Dickey, 2005A; 
Ross, 2005; Solomon; 2003). The new danger is not technological growth, deadlier 
weapons, or more lethal biological warfare: it is the women who sneak in to attack under 
the ironclad guise of pregnancy and innocence who undermine our senses of security. In 
2002, the father of 18-year:-old Palestinian woman Ayat Akhras mourned the death of his 
daughter for her participation in a suicide bombing (Applebaum, 2002) while the mother 
of Wafa Idris, the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, described her daughter as a 
martyr and hoped other women would follow in her path ("Female bomber's mother 
speaks out," 2002). And follow her path they do; the militant Israeli-Arab group allied 
1 Zedalis, I. 
with Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement that am1ed Akhras, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
has set up a special unit to train female suicide boi;nbers. Young girls readily discuss the 
idea of becoming martyrs themselves. One young neighbor of Akhras reports, "If I had 
the means, I would have done it yesterday" (Cameron, 2002). Beyond the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, women are committing terrorist acts in Italy (Weinberg, 1987), the U.S. 
(Morgan, 2001), Chechnya (Dougherty, 2003), and numerous 'other places. 
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Given the surge in the reporting of this phenomenon, whether it is inherent in 
human behavior or an advent of low intensity conflict in the modern era, the rhetorical 
world of the "female suicide bomber" must be tackled. Toward that end, this thesis will 
move through eight sections that will discuss and analyze the implications, assumptions 
and perceptions of suicide bombers. Strong links between history, technology and 
rhetoric will demonstrate some of the ways in which women living in oppression can 
seek "violent" liberation without subscribing to masculine structures of violence. The 
first section will bring to light a significant rhetorical event that served as the Palestinian 
debut of the "shahida," or female suicide bomber, and has radically changed the 
rhetorical landscape of women and warfare. The second section will discuss the many 
labels used for "female suicide bombers" and determine the term that is most appropriate 
for the purposes of this paper. Next, a review of both popular and scholarly works will 
aid in building upon current analysis and theory regarding Palestinian women who 
become suicide bombers. 
Sections Four and Five build upon one another in taking a comprehensive look at 
how images and perceptions of shahida women are formed and regenerated through news 
media activity, and also highlight the fact that a lack of historical review significantly 
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affects the ways in which these women are viewed in contemporary society. The sixth 
section begins to incorporate history into the analysis of shahida rhetoric, concluding that 
although women who choose to become suicide bombers may be a comparatively new 
category to Palestine and to the world as a whole. violent women have always existed and 
taken part in warfare in various ways. Section Six draws a parallel between the John 
Durham Peters' (2000) work on the spiritualist movement in the United States during the 
18th and 19th centuries. Spiritualism is a movement that was sparked after the advent of 
the telegraph that increased popular belief in communication with an alternative, spiritual 
world. This movement is closely linked to the beginnings of the suffrage movement 
because it opened doors for expression and agency for women, who were believed to be 
naturally more sensitive to spiritual mediums, particularly in the public sphere. Similarly, 
the decision by male-headed Islamist groups like Hamas "use" women as a tactical 
advantage could provide women a similar avenue for agency and expression in the public 
sphere, their messages more easily disseminated with the use of teclmology like 
television and the Internet. Section Seven links notions of technology and history to the 
work of feminist theorist Donna Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, 
and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" (1991 ), in which she works to 
deconstruct binaries between "technophilia" and "technophobia," arguing that "cyborgs" 
are political actors that defy traditional binary thinking and are important for social 
change. Thus, shahida women can be conceptualized as cyborgs that hold important 
implications for the future of Palestinian women. The Eighth and final section writes 
through three different theorists to offer a reconceptualization of shahida women. based 
It starts with Nancy Fraser's work on "subaltern publics" (1992); moves to a distinction 
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between feminist and non-feminist violence according to Jeffner Allen's theoretical 
writing on "lesbian" violence ( 1991 ); and then seeks "ways out" of oppressive societies 
through writing as a method of "doing violence" to masculine structures (Helene Cixous, 
1975). In societies that lack democratic structures, perhaps shahidas can be considered as 
doing violence with "bodily writing." 
In the final section of the paper, a number of conclusions emerge in regards to the 
topic of shahida warfare as a rhetorical subject of interest as well as a means of 
liberation. First, although shahida women are seen as tools in the task of Palestinian 
liberation, there is room for expressions of agency and political within this structure. 
Warfare of this nature on its own, however, is a masculine structure and controlled by 
men, so the violence that is incurred could be classified as purely patriarchal. Regardless, 
violence of this kind does open new avenues for agency to be expressed in the public 
sphere. Rhetorical events like Arafat's "a1my of roses" speech may be sending 
Palestinian society on a trajectory towards a feminist movement that is building upon the 
notion that women are accepted within the institution of warfare. It is crucial that women 
across the world living in societies that lack democratic structures have ownership over 
actions and can structure their own movements for liberation. This cannot be seen in the 
situation of shahidu women.2 Through the works of Fraser (1992), Allen (1991 ), and 
Cixous (1975), the essay will offer ways in which women might engage technology, faith 
and warfare to claim a liberation of their own. 
2 Sherine Hafez's (200 I) ethnography provides an example of Islamic women who, nonviolently, use their 
faith and the Qu'ran to spearhead a feminist movement. While Allen (1991) might argue that they are 
ascribing to masculine conceptions of women as docile and nonviolent, Cixous (1975) would contend that 
they are performing violence by rupturing the notion of Islamic faith as oppressive to women by using it as 
a method for liberation. 
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I. Inve11ti11g shahida 
On January 27, 2002, Yasser Arafat delivered a speech to one thousand women 
from his compound in Ramallah, shifting dramatically the rhetoric surrounding the 
Palestinian holy war. He called upon his audience, his "army ofroses," to join the fight 
against Israel and join in Islamic jihad. 3 In his remarks, Arafat single-handedly 
reinvented the word shahide, Arabic for "martyr" by using it in the feminine, as 
"shahida." His speech marked the beginning of a dramatic shift .in tactics and ideology in 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Arafat proclaimed: 
Women and men are equal. You are my army of roses that will crush Israeli 
tanks ... You are the hope of Palestine. You will liberate your husbands, fathers, and sons 
from oppression. You will sacrifice the way you, women, have always sacrificed for your 
family (Victor, 2003, p.19-20). 
Arafat played on women's traditional roles as wives, protectors of the "home," and as 
domestic victims to broaden the scope of their gender interests to a national level. The 
news media wondered: "Do women see themselves as empowered political actors? Are 
their interests are rooted in a desire to become equal partners to men? Or, are they 
choosing to end their lives for more personal reasons, as women living in a society 
saddled with strict gender roles?" It is impossible to know what complexities drive 
women into suicide bombing. We are left with what the news media present through 
images, interviews, and analysis. A female supervisor at a terror camp says, "Suicide 
bombing has pulled women out of the boxes created by society - the box of a weeping, 
3 Islamic doctrine calls upon its worshippers to combat enemies of their faith. This duty, calledjihad, can 
be completed either by tongue, hand, heart, or sword. Jihad by sword means directly engaging in war in 
order to defend Islam (Encarta Encyclopedia, 2005). 
wailing creature always crying for help ... Can anyone say that men are greater patriots 
than women?" (Regular in Beyler, 2004) Are these women a new wave of feminists in 
their own right? 
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The very same afternoon that Arafat delivered his speech, he found his first 
shahida. Wafa Idris, 28, strapped with explosives, detonated herself in the bustling shops 
of Jaffa Road in Israel, killing one man and wounding ninety people. Exactly one month 
later, 21-year-old Dareen Abu Aysheh did the same at the Israeli Maccabim roadblock in 
West Ramallah (West Bank), wounding four Israelis. On March 29, 2002, Ayat Akhras, 
an _18-year-old girl. killed herself and two Israelis in a suicide attack at Jerusalem 
supermarket in Kyriat Hayovel (Beyler, 2003). Following in their stead are young girls 
who dream of one day becoming martyrs themselves; they attend summer camps 
dedicated to Idris and Akhras, vowing to become Palestinian heroines in their own right 
(Applebaum, 2002; Barr, 2002). There is no shortage of opportunity. Beyond the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, women are becoming involved in subnational groups all over 
the world, committing terrorist acts in the U.S. (Morgan, 2001), Chechnya (Dougherty, 
2003; Zakaria, 2003), Turkey (Zakaria, 2003) and elsewhere. 
All the while, news media search for sociological, psychological, and cultural 
answers for the recent rise of the female terrorist. Spawned from attention drawn to 
Middle East during the current U.S. War on Terror, journalists ask, "What went wrong?" 
As audiences, we are accustomed to images of oppressed Muslim women, beaten, veiled, 
and pitiful. Female terrorists are portrayed as deviant from the subjective norm of 
passivity, victims of social or personal turmoil, signs of a society gone awry. Discourse 
over female terrorists as a new or modem "problem" shifts these women into passivity, 
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constructed as victims of their situation and not the revolutionaries or "martyrs" their 
male counterparts are proclaimed to be. The "advent" of women suicide bombers has 
created an ahistorical category that has systematically clouded over centuries of women 
enacting violence. Rarely is the possibility of an empowered and female-oriented 
violence considered in feminist theory. Female bombers today are discussed as a recent 
social phenomenon, a strange and frightening tum of events that signals a gradual moral 
decay for Palestinians, Muslims, and the world. 
A rhetorical analysis of shahida culture reveals a number of observations that are 
crucial to understanding women, gender, and violence. This essay will work to 
complicate shahida rhetoric in order to give light to its varied and layered meanings and 
implications, deconstructing labels and ideas that oversimplify women's individual 
motivations, whether they are personal, cultural, national, etc. No analysis of women and 
gender is complete without including that of the shahida; histories of violent women are 
systematically occluded when the topic of women bombers are introduced, and often the 
media does not account for the fact that some women have always been violent and 
participated in violent acts. Without recognizing the historicity of violent women and the 
ways in: which their agency is exerted through these acts, harmful dichotomies of 
masculine violence and feminine docility will continue to oppress and subject. News 
media and academics alike continue to make harmful assumptions about women and 
violence without providing historical context. A briefreview of history reveals violent 
women pirates (Stanley l 995), female leaders responsible for genocide (Morgan, 2001), 
and infamous female assassins have always figured in warfare (Pearson, 1997). 
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While the violent capabilities of women are no surprise to anyone, somehow news 
media stories about the rise of the female suicide bomber express shock and fear over 
Palestinian women's increasing participation in religious jihad. Questions over their 
motivations as being different than those of males ensue: have they been brainwashed? 
Are they attempting to redeem themselves to their families after divorce or rape? Are 
they truly devoted Islamists like their male counterparts? Certainly new conceptions of 
this component of humanity that are not strictly masculine should be created so as to 
understand violence as inherently feminine and masculine. Western feminist theory that 
does incorporate violence as a means for liberation should be recognized and discussed, 
as it gives light to the ways in which women's actions can be figured as acceptable or at 
least explainable. The link between spirituality, warfare, and technology is also 
significant here. As shahidas learn to become equipped with heavy explosives strapped to 
their bodies (Zedalis, 2004 ), they confront an expansion of their own abilities as weapons 
of war, heroines of battle. These technologies of war - as rudimentary as many 
explosives are - can be linked to women's entry into the public sphere in the late 17th 
century. As spirituality has often fallen along the feminine side of a gendered binary 
across rri.any cultures, women in Islamic countries are finding that there are avenues for 
agency through spirituality. For some, this might mean the use of their body for bombing 
as a way to escape a life of oppression or to express religious devotion. For others, as 
Sherine Hafez (2001) finds in her ethnography, piety is an avenue for a nonviolent, 
feminist liberation. Could shahida women become the beginning of a new wave of 
feminism in Palestine? If not, they are at least catalysts for discussion and analyses of 
women, violence and warfare. 
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This section has briefly introduced the rhetorical debut of the shahida, an event 
that marked a shift in not only ideology, but popular conceptions about women and 
violence in Palestine. Arafat's speech makes way for a more contoured discussion of the 
label "female" preceding suicide bomber and the phraseology surrounding these acts. 
II. Labeli11g Female Suicide Bombers 
This section will review the temis often used to describe those who detonate 
explosives strapped to their own bodies, simultaneously killing themselves, killing and 
maiming others, and destroying property around them. Determining the most appropriate 
term for these actors is crucial to capturing the multi-faceted nature of their purposes, 
motivations, and actions. 
The labels that are applied to women who become suicide bombers are not 
adequate to describe the complexity of their actions or the diversity of their motivations, 
while still remaining conscious of difference. Careful attention must be paid to value-
laden phraseology. The term "female suicide bomber" in English has become entrenched 
in assumptions and does not capture the sense of ideology or nationalism that is important 
to becoming a "martyr." The term "suicide bomber" alone is also assumed to be male 
without a gendered qualifier to denote otherwise. In popular media, the term "male 
suicide bomber" is never heard, nor is "suicide bomber" alone considered ambiguous. 
The qualifier exists only for women. Furthermore, "suicide bomber" capitalizes on the 
introspectiveness of the violence but does nothing to address the destruction caused to the 
other victims of the event. There is difficulty capturing the simultaneity of killing oneself 
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along with a number of others. "Homicide bomber," a phraseology Fox News has used, 
does address outward violence but does not capture the introspective component of 
bombing. With heavier use in Western news media, it too would likely require a gendered 
qualifier because it is so similar in construction to suicide bomber. "Homicide bomber" 
also immediately categorizes the actor as a murderer. The connotations of this term have 
the potential to overshadow the myriad of other factors involved in bombing, particularly 
the notion that bombers are not just killing for the sake of doing so, but also sacrificing 
themselves for a cause. Furthermore, if these women are labeled primarily as murderers, 
what then ofrhetorically rich words like "soldier" and "freedom fighter"? Certainly one 
of a soldier's primary activities is to engage in violence against other humans, yet its 
connotation is a fairly positive one in Western culture. Both "soldiers" and "bombers" 
_engage in acts that hold ideological and personal weight, and their phraseology should 
reflect this. Reuter (2004) uses the phrase "suicide assassins" often in his book, which 
does well capturing the simultaneity of the act, but captures little of the ideological 
element. 
.The European and Arab news media's use ·of the word "human bomb"4 does help 
to capture the simultaneity of a suicide/homicide, but does little to incorporate the 
ideological and political nature of this violence. "Human" bomb is almost too rhetorically 
neutral to fully engage an audience in the ideological gravity and weight of the act, as 
distinguished from typical Western thought about warfare. The human label also 
objectifies the person involved, as it is the word "human" that modifies "bomb," rather 
than the type of bomb being contingent on the agent that detonates it. One of this term's 
4 Aljazeera.net uses this term almost exclusively. See McGreal (2005); Dozens killed, wounded in Bali 
blasts (2005); Soldiers wounded in Gaza blast (2004). 
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main advantages, however, is its lack of gendered assumptions-adding a gender 
qualifier to the term would be somewhat awkward to an audience, and therefore it is up to 
the speaker to explicitly state the gender of the bomber. 
While language falls short of appropriately capturing the reflexive and outwardly 
destructive simultaneity of bombing, the term "shahida" is best used for the purposes of 
this essay. Perhaps shahida capitulates on the ideology of bombing too closely and does 
not appropriately address the violence and destruction that ensues with bombing of this 
sort. But, because it came into use in a direct call to women to become suicide/homicide 
bombers, its use is linked directly to this type of violence. It is also automatically 
gendered, and therefore the speaker cannot help but use the correct word when referring 
to men or women. While none of these labels are sufficiently descriptive, the term 
shahida is most appropriate for the purposes of this paper. Shahide or shahida will be 
used to refer to "female suicide bombers" in an effort to address a number of rhetorical 
conflicts. Shahida remains true to its Arabic origins and contemporary context, and is 
most appropriate for the current academic inquiry because of its very recent origin, 
Arafat) 2002 speech. Because shahida has no verb fonri, the term "bombing"/ 
"bombers" will simply be used in order to convey action. Having reviewed common 
phraseology for "suicide bombing," and having determined the most appropriate label, 
shahidela, a review of the work - both academic and popular - completed on shahida 
women allows us to consider varying perspectives on the topic. 
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III. Re-viewing shahida literature 
A review of popular media pieces is crucial to understanding how social discourse 
is shaped around female suicide bombers. Evidence of cultural conceptions of gender and 
violence is found in news headlines and popular media. 5 The rhetoric of violence often 
falls along the same gendered binary that separates the masculine and the feminine, the 
mind and the body. It is socially characterized worldwide as a masculine trait, a natural 
tendency of maleness, while women are the frail, the weak, and the naturally nonviolent. 
When women do commit acts of violence, they are deemed to be social anomalies or 
powerless victims of their situation. Often, women bombers' motives for their actions are 
5 A sampling of headlines from Western news media provide insight into the discourse surrounding shahidas. 
Applebaum, A. (2002, April 22). Girl suicide bombers. Retrieved October 11, 2004, from Slate Web site: 
http://www.slate.com/?id=2063954 
Arun, N. (2005, November 15). Women bombers break new ground. Retrieved December I, 2005, from BBC News 
Web site: http://news.bbc.eo.uk/2/hi/rniddle_east/4436368.stm · 
Barr, C. W. (2002, April I). Why a Palestinian girl now wants to be a suicide bomber. Christian Science Monitor. 
Retrieved October 11, 2004, from http://www.csrnonitor.com/2002/040l/p07s01-wome.html 
Beyl er, C. (2003, February 12). Chronology of suicide bombings carried out by women. Retrieved December 3, 2005, 
from The Institute for Counter-Terrorism Web site: http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=471 
Beyler, C. (2004, March 7). Female suicide bombers: an update. Retrieved December I, 2005, from The Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism Web site' http://www.ict.org. i l/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=508 
Davis, J. (2004, October 21). Women suicide bombers -- equality in terror? Retrieved December I, 2005, from The 
Globalist Web site: http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/printStoryld.aspx?Storyld=4223 
Dickey, C:(2005, September 7). The suicide solution. Newsweek. Retrieved December I, 2005, from MSNBC.com 
Web site: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9230559/site/newsweek/ 
Dougherty, J. (2003, July 11). Chechnya's 'black widow' bombers. Retrieved September/October 11, 2004, from 
CNN.corn Web site: ://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/07/l 1/russia.black.widows/ 
Female bomber's mother speaks out. (2004, January 30). Retrieved October 11, 2004, from BBC News Web site: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ I /hi/world/middle_ east/1791800.strn 
Female suicide bomber wanted to die a martyr. (2002, January 3 I): Irish Examiner. Retrieved December I, 2005, from 
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2002/01/31 /story2215 l .asp 
Husseini, S. (2005, November 16). A very crude culture: trying to look female suicide bombers in the eye. Retrieved 
December I, 2005, from Counterpunch.org Web site: http://www.counterpunch.org/husseini 11162005.html 
Marcus, I. (2003, October 9). Promoting Women Terrorists. Retrieved December I, 2005, from Israel's War Against 
Terror Web site: http://www.israel-wat.com/idris_eng2.htm 
Mercer, I. (2005, November 16). It's those seventy Chippendale dancers that await in Hell. Message posted to 
http://blog.ilanamercer.com/?s=suicide+bomber 
Palestinian women martyrs against the Israeli occupation. (2004). Retrieved December I, 2004, from 
http://www.91lreview.org/W get/aztlan.net/women _martyrs.him 
Ross, B. (2005, November 14). Female suicide bombers: A new Al-Qaeda tactic? Retrieved December 3, 2005, from 
ABC News Web site: http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/lnvestigation/story?id=l 312273 
Solomon, J. (2003, April 2). FBI warns of female terror recruits. Boston Globe. Retrieved December 3, 2005, from 
http://www. boston. com/ d ai I ygl obe2/092/nation/FB I_ warns_ of _f ernale _terror _recruits 
more heavily scrutinized than those of men, whose videotaped testimonials are often 
taken at face value (Toles-Patkin, 2004). Researchers often look for emotional reasons 
behind these acts when women commit them, whereas males' actions are considered to 
be more wholly political (Ramachandran, 2003). The "female" qualifier in front of 
"suicide bomber" can skew popular perceptions of these women in order to fit negative 
gender stereotypes about violence, while discourse surrounding male bombers has 
become accepted as a norm. The gendered qualifier highlights some abnormality in the 
act, while "suicide bomber" alone is always male and never neutral. 
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There are few examples of academic scholarship about shahida women, and even 
fewer written earlier than 200 I (Brooks, 2002; Dworkin, n.d.; Morgan, 2001; Toles-
Patkin, 2004; Zedalis, 2004). While popular works have begun to crop up, academia is 
just beginning to consider Palestinian shahidas. In popular literature, Barbara Victor, a 
freelance journalist, wrote one of the first books on the topic, Army of Roses (2003). This 
research details her interviews with those affected by shahidas, imprisoned "failed" 
bombers, psychologists, and various Israeli and Palestinian government officials. She too 
asks questions about the motivations behind the bombings: What leads someone to 
martyrdom? What drives that person to kill? Victor also discusses political events that 
have lead to the use of suicide bombers in Palestine, discussing the ideological shifts that 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Victor (2003) describes the diverse lives of the women 
she studied, finding that many viewed "martyrdom" as a welcome release to a lifetime of 
border conflict and a lack of opportunity (Victor, 2003). Zedalis (2004) had similar 
findings, stating that there is no way to generalize motivations. She found that the only 
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thing these women had in common was that they were young, generally between the ages 
of21-23, though often even younger children are recruits (Zedalis, 2004). 
Journalists have continued to ask questions about the motivations of shahidas, 
assuming that their motives are different than those of males (Toolis, 2003; Zoroya, 
2002). In fact, many of the women's videotaped "wills" or testimonials that are recorded 
shortly before detonation (generally laden with scripture and pre-planned statements as 
directed by trainers) are more heavily scrutinized than those of males', whose messages 
are generally considered at face value (Toles-Patkin, 2004). Other sources analyze these 
women as part of a new tactic adopted by Islamist groups in order to more easily pass 
through security checkpoints (Ross, 2005; Arnn, 2005, Fighel, 2003). Perhaps the most 
popular endeavor of Western journalists is to seek out reasons why women were "driven" 
into the act-either by way of failed marriages, abuse, vengeance, or other painful 
experiences (Zedalis, 2004, Zakaria, 2003; Toolis, 2003). Finally, many media 
explorations ask if suicide bombing is the vehicle through which women are finally 
gaining equality in Arab society (Davis, 2004; Applebaum, 2002; Zakaria, 2003; 
Dworkin). 
Reuter (2004), a German writer, asks questions similar to Victor (2003), but 
studies both men and women who become suicide bombers. He, too, argues that popular 
media conceptions of bombers as crazed or brainwashed individuals fall short of 
understanding the complexities behind the decision to become a bomber. Reuter (2004), 
as well as Toles-Patkin (2004), both emphasize that the women and men that participate 
in martyrdom operations are often highly educated and well-adjusted individuals with a 
distinct passion to make a difference, no matter the cost. Like Victor (2003), Reuter 
18 
(2004) also conducts interviews with would-be martyrs, their trainers, friends, and 
relatives. 
Wiktorowicz (2004) edited a collection of essays that discuss the notion of 
Islamic activism under the application of social movement theory. While bombing is not 
discussed in the book, his opening discusses the use of violence by some Muslim activist 
groups: 
In contradistinction to popular perceptions of radical Islamic groups as irrational, 
"crazy," or deviant, these groups frequently follow a particular dynamic that 
mirrors the rational calculus of other non-Islamic social movement actors who 
have used violence as part of their repertoire of contention (p. 20). 
Wiktorowicz not only reinforces the notion that those who commit violence within 
fundamentalist groups can deploy reason to guide their decisions, but also identifies the 
activist structures themselves as no different than many other Western concepts of social 
movements. Violence, he suggests, is simply another means to an end. Brooks (2002), 
however, takes this notion further and contends that Palestinian leaders recognize that a 
"culture of martyrdom" is their most potent weapon. An unlikely political and ideological 
shift must occur in order for this tactic to die out (Brooks, 2002). But Western media 
outlets continue to report that there is no Jack of volunteers, male and female, to become 
martyrs, and even children are idolizing those mar_tyrs pictured in heroic posters and on 
television (Applebaum, 2002; Barr, 2002; Davis, 2004; Toolis, 2003). Interestingly, 
Toles-Patkin (2004) reports that parents of shahides and shahidas may present 
themselves differently to the media, depending on whether the outlet is of an Islamic of 
Western origin. Victor (2003) also considers the reactions of shahida parents as integral 
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to the creation of imagery, symbolism and rhetoric surrounding the immortalization of 
their children after martyrdom operations. 
The image is of parents so wronged and humiliated by the Israelis that they would 
rather sacrifice their children than continue to endure .... While some parents 
assure the Western media that they would have stopped their child from 
committing suicide if they had known of the child's plan, they simultaneously 
express pride in the child's final act (Copeland, 2002). However, there is some 
evidence that parents, especially mothers, recognize this dissonance and 
experience a delayed grief reaction that must of necessity be masked from the 
Palestinian media (2003, p. 82). 
Exploring the ways in which "audiences" - from friends and family to the immediate 
community and the Arabic society at large - are affected by a particular event should 
reveal some of the ways in which ideology regarding warfare and violence are regarded. 
In the U.S. during the late 20111 century, the idea of maximum distance began to dominate 
how wars were conducted, as the safety of combatants became a priority. Now, 
Westerners cannot identify as strongly with the notion of sacrificing oneself for a cause 
because military technology has all but eliminated the need to do so. Palestinians now 
have one of the most powerful weapons at their disposal with the most rudimentary of 
technologies by simply eliminating distance and invoking strong religion-based ideology 
in the equation of warfare. 
While few in academia have strongly considered histories of violent women in 
their analyses of shahidas, still fewer have discussed the roles women have held in 
warfare through cultures and ages. When analyzed against a contextual backdrop, 
shahidas suddenly appear not as a socio-cultural abnormality or phenomenon, but as yet 
another development in the close-knit history of women and warfare. The review of the 
works of various scholars and journalists in this section has provided a backdrop for the 
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development of a more analytically comprehensive theory surrounding shahida rhetoric, 
violence,_and gender. News media is instrumental.in shaping and reproducing the rhetoric 
that, in tum, widely shapes social perception and cultural norms. This cycle only furthers 
normative stereotypes about women and gender. 
JV. Wome11, gender and tlze media 
This section aims to analyze the effects and implications that news media outlets 
have on creating and shaping shahida rhetoric and perceptions about women, violence, 
and their social roles. As many news media pieces suggest,6 it is doubtful that shahidas' 
male trainers, or "handlers," see them as anyhing more than a new tactical advantage. 
They can feign pregnancies, they are economically advantageous (shahida families are 
usually compensated at a lifetime stipend of about $200 a month, whereas shahides' 
families are paid about $400; Victor, 2003), they require less persuasion, they need less 
training then their male counterparts (Toles-Patkin, 2004), and are less likely to be 
suspected and searched by Israeli officials (Zedalis, 2004). It is often the men that are 
charged with victimizing women by using them as tools to promote Islamic jihad 
(Dworkin, 2002; Toles-Patkin, 2004). Shahidas, however, also suffer from victimization 
at the hands of an omnipotent source - the media. Shahide/a operations are well-suited 
for - and arguably dependent upon - television and images in order to generate publicity 
and, therefore, more recruits. This dependency puts in the hands of thousands of 
journalists the power to shape the rhetoric behind shahida operations. Through pre-
operation video testimonials, the words of families and friends, and images on posters, 
6 See Applebaum, 2002, Barr, 2002 and Davis, 2004 for examples. 
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there is much left open to interpretation. Unfortunately, this power of dissemination has 
done no justice to women and gender in Muslim societies. Women are once again 
victimized and rendered powerless in favor of gendered stereotypes at the hands of media 
outlets, both Islamic and Western. 
Trends regarding the dissemination of information, images, technology, news 
media, distance, spirituality and gender reveal how Westerners and Islamic nations alike 
negotiate the role of the female suicide bomber and the justifications for violence of this 
nature. While violent women are not new to the world, the recent increase in numbers of 
shahidas since Wafa Idris detonated herself in 2002 has generated a significant amount of 
media attention towards them as categorically distinct from male bombers. Western 
journalists are also fascinated with the female bomber, struggling to make a connection 
between the gentler sex and violence of this nature. 7 Is there "equality in terror," as Davis 
(2004) put it? Or, are women simply another tool in the male-dominated Palestinian holy 
war? Images of women martyrs are all too common in Palestine and other Muslim 
societies today; young children learn to value death over life, exchanging "martyr 
medallions," much like Western children do with trading cards, and hanging posters of 
these heroes and heroines on their bedroom walls (Toles-Patkin, 2004; Brooks, 2002). 
While Victor's (2003) work offers an unparalleled look into the lives of shahida 
operatives, she also searches into the private lives of these women, looking for clues of 
estrangement or turmoil. "When an adolescent boy is humiliated at an Israeli checkpoint, 
from that moment, a suicide bomber is created. At the same time, if a woman becomes a 
shahida, one has to look for deeper, more underlying reasons" (Dickey in Victor, 2003, p. 
7 See Applebaum, 2002; Arnn, 2005; Barr, 2002; Davis, 2004; Dickey, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; "Female· 
suicide bomber's mother speaks out," 2004; "Female suicide bomber wanted to die a martyr," 2002; 
Mercer, 2005; Ross, 2005; Zakaria, 2003; Zoroya (n.d.). 
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xi). No doubt that male handlers treat female trainees differently, but it is not uncommon 
for the media to search for its own explanations. Ayat Akhras, who detonated in 2002, 
was known for her strong interest in politics and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, 
Victor's (2003) speculations root her decision in the humiliation her family experienced 
within their community when her father refused to quit his job working for Israelis 
(Toles-Patkin, 2004). Hanadi Tayseer Jaradat, 29, who detonated in 2003, was considered 
to have been motivated by the deaths of her brother and cousin at the hands of Israeli 
forces (Palestinian Women Martyrs Against the Israeli Occupation, 2004). In her video, 
she extols nationalism and vows to fight against Zionism. She does not mention her 
brother in the video, although it is common for those who are seeking vengeance for a 
relative to do so. As in this case and many others, it is common for the emotional 
possibilities of revenge. depression, grief, etc. to be foregrounded over other reasons, as 
Toles-Patkin (2004) explains: 
Media coverage, particularly in the West, appears to actively search 
for alternate explanations behind women's participation in terror in a 
way that does not seem paralleled in the coverage of male suicide 
bombers, whose official ideological statements appear to be taken at 
face value. In the case of the relatively few female terrorists, media 
coverage profoundly emphasizes the emotional over the ideological in 
an effort to provide comprehensible explanations (n.p.). 
Victor (2003) offers little speculation as to Jaradat's political motivations, which may or 
may not have played a p1rt in her decision to become a shahida. Either way, nationalistic 
ideals are all but disregarded as possible explanations for Akhras' actions. 
Others choose to ignore social and political tensions that can help explain how the 
Arab world's justifications of suicide bombing came to be. In her blog, Ilana Mercer, a 
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Jewish freelance journalist and former resident oflsrael, cites Rothbard when positing the 
"real" source of slwhidda operations: 
Driven or exploited? Depending on which story you hear, failed 
Iraqi suicide bomber Sajida Rishawi is either a pawn of a patriarchal 
society or a criminal who conned herself into a corner as tight as the 
corset of explosives she failed to detonate. Books that belabor the 
"Three P's''-patriarchy, poverty, and powerlessness-to varying 
degrees abound. There's Christoph Reuter?s My Life Is a Weapon: A 
Modern History of Suicide Bombing, Barbara Victor's Army of Roses: 
Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers ... It's a 
growth industry. [Writer] Murray N. Rothbard got it right ... : "In dealing 
with crime;· he wrote. "liberals are concentrating on the wrong root 
causes. That is. on 'poverty' or 'child abuse' instead of a rotten immoral 
character" (Mercer, 2005). 
Mercer argues that all humans are agents of free will, despite their so-called social 
circumstances. She imposes her privileged position as a woman with means and greater 
freedoms upon those living within a "culture of martyrdom." Mercer's blog, readily 
available for popular consumption on the Internet, profligates precisely what writers like 
Cixous critique; ignorance of the multiple layers of social, cultural, and gendered 
vulnerabilities that disproportionately effect women in Islamist societies. Without an 
understanding of these forces. one cannot fully comprehend the development of the 
concept of martyrdom and shahida violence. 
It is, of course, very difficult to try and understand what shahidas are "really" 
thinking when they decide to train for a bombing. What little is known about these 
women can be pieced together from the edited video recordings, the prepared statements 
that they leave behind with their trainers, and the testimonials that their families provide 
the media. There is an awkward gap, however, between the rhetoric of the shahidas and 
the comments left by family and friends that cannot be accounted for in the absence of 
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the women ~vho lived their own experiences (Toles-Patkin, 2004; Brooks, 2003). With 
only these artifacts. it is impossible to fully understand the agency behind the action. 
Capitalizing on that opportunity. Islamists do not delay in creating sanitizing imagery and 
language that serve as r~cruitment tools for future generations of shahidas. These young 
girls are attending summer camps for future slwhidas, collecting posters, and watching 
repeatedly broadcast concerts honoring the "first" Palestinian shahida, Wafa Idris 
(Marcus, 2003). Imagery separates responsibility and consequence to the extent that even 
terrorism can be portrayed in a positive light, morally justifying these disastrous actions. 
This section has attempted to shed light upon a litany of issues that have brought 
forth gender as a defining category in the issue of bombing. In spite of such strong 
indoctrination, women's participation in such violence continues to be a topic of great 
concern and shock to many. particularly in Western culture. While shahida women are 
certainly worth trepidation. fear and sorrow, it is important to understand that they imply 
no more damage than their male counterparts and the issue should not be treated as one of 
gender, but one of power, intimidation and ethnic war. Certainly, the participation of 
women in violent extremism should be of no surprise. Indeed, with a closer look at how 
history tells the story of centuries of violent women, we should be able to better analyze 
the so-called "advent" of shahidas. 
V. Conceptions of women and warfare 
This section will contend that, by ignoring history, those who write about 
shahidas shape their rhetorical worlds in a way that belies the nature of their existence. 
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Furthermore, efforts to "'get inside" the minds of these women have little value without 
considering historical, cultural and social factors that could privilege one's writing. Most 
news media pieces offer emotionally engaging accounts of women wronged by society, 
"brainwashed," or desperate for freedom from oppressive lives. Written with sorrow, 
regret, and ethnocentricity, these pieces figure wo~en as poster children for the failure of 
the Muslim world. Y ct we cannot forget the striking parallels between the rhetoric of 
shahida and that of American military forces; the term "freedom fighter" is heard both in 
Islamicjihad8 and by the U.S. military in the War on Terror. As this section will 
demonstrate, the imagery regenerated by the news media makes harmful assumptions 
about shahidas' place in time and space. 
The common assumption that the female terrorist is a recent social development, a 
point of arrival in history, is to suggest that women have progressed as a sex, perhaps to a 
culmination in which they have begun to enter a masculine landscape. Shahidas blur the 
line between the normative gender binaries of life-giving nurturer and violent destroyer, 
the latter reserved for only the most masculine and deviant of women. It is certainly 
confusing for Westerners. who often perceive Islamic cultures as more oppressive to 
women, to see Islamist groups allow and even encourage women to join their ranks. The 
idea of women in the military is a controversial topic even in the West, where we often 
consider ourselves more progressive in terms of women's rights than Muslim societies. It 
is difficult to stomach the "right to fight" as a privilege of empowerment, even if the 
disassociation of women from violence is one of the myths shattered by shahidas. 
Islamist terrorists are training women for "martyrdom operations," the very same group 
8 Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, is said to have described the 
Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas as "freedom fighters." See Palmer, 2005. 
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relegated to the home and said to have no role in the public sphere.9 Nonviolence and 
nurturance are considered characteristics of the feminine, and only women in the most 
desperate of situations would resort to violence. When they do, they are not analyzed as 
murderers of citizens or criminals, but as symbols of total desolation. The focus is not on 
their crime, b1;1t what made them do it. Do male counterparts force them into submission? 
Are they seeking empowerment or equality with men? Do the men see them as equal, or 
just part of some "perfect demographic" that easily defeats the failure of imagination of 
their selected targets? l\fodern exemplars include Leila Khaled, a Palestinian activist who 
hijacked her first plane at age twenty-five in 1969: Women have few examples to follow 
should they decide to step out of the private sphere and become a "martyr", not a 
"producer of martyrs". 
Even though slwhidas tend to headline newspapers, violent women are nothing 
new to humankind. 1° Female cruelty is not confined, as the news media might suggest, to 
Islamists who kill themselves and others. We see it in the case of Lynndie England, new 
mother and U.S. Army private, who was charged with nineteen counts of abuse of Iraqi 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. We also see it in the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 
who stood trial for a 1994 massacre in Rwanda that included the use of rape and genocide 
as a weapon against humanity (Devine, 2004). We also tend to forget about American 
terrorist groups like the Symbionese Liberation Party and the Weather Underground that 
both had a number of female leaders. It wasn't until reports of female bombers after the 
9 See Mernissi, 1987. 
10 History certainly belies the gender binary of the "naturally" nonviolent female. Traversing cultural and 
social context, there have always been women who have broken through the gender norms of their time 
period. Jo Stanley's (1995) work reviews a critical history of - and retrospectively claims the existence of -
women pirates throughout time and space, discussing the many different roles they occupied that are 
forgotten from collective histories. 
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attacks of September 11, 2001, however, that the U.S. government and the Department of 
Homeland Security finally snapped to attention, instructing officials in airport security to 
profile both males and females as security threats. 
So why use one· s own body as a weapon to kill? What is so effective about 
detonating oneself when a person has much more potential for a particular cause while 
still alive? Given proper conditioning for the event, anyone can carry out a successful 
detonation because the body and a few pounds of explosives are all that is required. Each 
attempt costs only about S 150 to prepare (Hoffman, 2003), and the bomber has ultimate 
control over the attack (time, location, and circumstances). Mass casualties are almost 
always guaranteed. Explosives strapped to a person can kill and maim and are much more 
difficult to defend against. Last-second changes in the plan can be made: should a 
bomber become wary of police presence, she can simply slip onto a bus and have the 
added effect of a fuel tank magnify her attack. Hoffman (2003) says shahide/as are the 
"ultimate smart bomb" ( 40): they can decide where and when to detonate depending on 
how they can inflict the most carnage. Hoffman (2003) defines the goal of terrorism as an 
attempt to " ... undermine public confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect and 
defend citizens, thereby creating a climate of fear and intimidation amenable to terrorist 
exploitation" (43). Suicide bombers have the capacity to create a large effect with 
minimal investment of material resources. The news media thrives on the sensationalism 
of a dramatic demise. Suicide terrorism has an international audience, and the immediate 
community is afflicted with such anxiety and fear that physical space seems to shrink. 
Evidence of this type of xenophobia as a result of suicide bombing can be found in Israel, 
where heavy attacks from Palestinians have made citizens afraid to go to restaurants, 
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markets, ride buses. or leave their homes. As Zedalis (2004) argues, "[The body] is the 
ultimate asymmetric weapon. You can assimilate among the people and then attack with 
an element of surprise that has an incredible and devastating shock value" (Ranstorp in 
Zedalis, 2004, p. 7). It is no surprise, then, that the female body has become a desirable 
commodity for terrorist organizations. 
The shift from the use of male shah ides between the ages.of 17 and 24 can be 
attributed to the need for a new demographic. Israeli and U.S. government officials were 
accustomed to male bombers, which provided women with a new avenue of opportunity. 
Indoctrination took hold. Women who had been rriped or divorced - and consequently 
dishonored - could seek mercy from Allah by sacrificing their bodies. Despite scripture 
and thousands of years during which women did not step into the public sphere (much 
less the political arena). they are now encouraged to do so. While the Qu'ran states that 
God punishes those who commit suicide, it rewards martyrs. "Think not of those who are 
slain in the cause of God as dead. Nay, they are alive in the presence of the Lord and are 
granted gifts from him" (Zedalis, 2004, p. 11). Bombers are promised a glorious Heaven 
of sorts after their death, as well as financial and social rewards for their families once the 
mission is complete. Due to its greater propensity for media coverage and sensationalism, 
the female body has been "discovered" as an ultimately more powerful system of 
weaponry and deemed worthy of martyrdom. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader 
of Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist organization, denounced the use of women in January 
2002 for reasons of modesty. Just two years later, however, Wafa Idris carried out her 
attack under Hamas training. Yassin defended this contradiction by citing it as a 
" ... significant evolution in our fight. The male fighters face many obstacles ... Women are 
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like the reserve anny-when there is a necessity, we use them" (Zedalis, 2004, p. 7). In 
the words of a training commander. "The body has become our most potent weapon. 
When we searched for new ways to resist the security complications facing us, we 
discovered that our \vomen could be an advantage" (Zedalis, 2004). Who is the collective 
"we" that the trainer refers to here? He credits himself and his colleagues with a 
discovery of women's potential usefulness for their operative. His' rhetoric forces 
passivity upon the women he "uses", placing himself and his organization as central and 
ultimately dominant over women's arrival on the scene. He takes control in shaping 
them, deciding when and where they will perform their attack. In training, women and 
girls are made to spend hours practicing walking and moving "naturally" with heavy 
ammunition strapped to their bodies . 
. . . Women were handling explosives and fah1iliarizing themselves with 
Kalashnikov sub-machine guns. Girls are taught to assemble and dismantle their 
AK-47 assault rifles, and target practice follows-as do hours of theory about the 
"enemy and its tactics." The details and outcome of each attack are dissected, 
revised, debated, and discussed. The women spend as much as 6 hours a day 
familiarizing themselves with explosives. They are introduced to the bomb belts 
that will rip their flesh, while killing and maiming those around them. Finally, the 
girls have to practice moving around with the weight of the explosive belts strapped 
to their bodies. Sometimes the explosives are distributed around the body; some 
strapped to their legs, others to their backs or abdomens. "It all depends on the build 
and shape of the woman and how best to strap her without over-bulging parts of her 
body," a male handler explained (Hala in Zedalis, 2004). 
The very shape of a woman's body has the potential to limit her when performing an 
attack. Any slightly abnormal bulge protruding from underneath her clothing or misstep 
from the weight of the explosives can give her away. A faked pregnancy is no longer a 
safe option, as the police are wary of these women, too (Zedalis, 2004; Toles-Patkin, 
2004). A woman's body. even while immortalized as life-giving, can be destructive and 
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dangerous. She occupies. like the cross-dressing female pirate, male and female space. 
She creates and destroys life. and no one knows whom, why, or when. When it comes to 
terrorizing, she is a strong weapon. 
The "use" of the female body as an agent for mass murder suggests that agency 
isn't entirely in the hands of the women who are trained for such an act. Islamic 
fundamentalism's recent surge through the 1980s and 1990s is influencing a number of 
different countries in th!.! Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean, such as Jordan, 
Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon. In many cases, these movements exist in opposition 
to the government. Islam ism introduced a mix of empowerment as well as restraint for 
young female professionals and students of the lower and middle classes. It appeals to 
women because, despite its limitations, it provides a new public space for them to enter 
either as bombers, activists, or simply declared members of the movement without their 
motives being questioned. The fundamentalist movement calls for more traditional roles 
for women including the adoption of h(jab, the Islamic dress code that includes veiling. 
For many unveiled women, using public transportation, working side-by-side with men, 
and staying out after certain hours. even for elderly women, were large obstacles in daily 
life; their bodies were constantly under the gaze of men. 
Women who choose to veil, however, report finding a form of freedom in 
removing their bodies from the public sphere. They face less sexual harassment, may be 
granted the right by their families to attend high school or college, socialize with larger 
groups of peers while promoting Islamist ideology, and may even choose their own 
husband. Those who join militant groups gain respect, authority, and power as guardians 
of morality on the streets of their cities, policing the bodies of the upper-class, secular 
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women for not upholding proper hijab, or for deviant behavior, such as bicycling (Afary, 
1997). Islam's militant factions have created an outlet for women to increase their 
opportunities, be it thrm:gh fundamentalist activism, education, employment, or training 
as a bomber/martyr. Islamism relies on bodily con"trol to produce and maintain its 
stronghold over women and further the movement, yet there are liberatory opportunities 
within the movement th2t are useful for women seeking life outside the private sphere. 
These opportunities are generated by a movement dominated by masculine ideology, one 
that exploits the female body as weaponry in its "reserve army" while at the same time 
protecting men from its dangers by enforcing hijab. Still, women turn to fundamentalism 
as one of few avenues through which their minds, if not their bodies, can enter the public, 
social and political spheres. 
On the contrary. while this fundamentalist uprising lays claim over women's 
bodies simultaneously as commodities for militant use as well as dangerous physical 
entities to be contained, Islamic feminists look for woman-focused agency that they can 
claim as their own. The rise of Islamic feminist movements is opening public spaces like 
coffee houses and mosques for women to share their ideas and experiences or worship 
together (Afary, 1997). In an ethnographical study of two Islamic women's religious 
groups in Cairo, Sherinc Hafez (2001) finds that the Western idea of secularism as 
essential for liberation is contrary to many the livelihoods of many Muslim non-
fundamentalist women who find that becoming closer to God through worship and 
community service is empowering for them. In studying and engaging in community 
activities together, these women work to bring themselves closer to God. 
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While shirking patriarchal ideology is not necessarily their first priority, the 
refusal to be obedient to anyone but Allah can do much to disempower normative 
oppression. In their devoutness they actively and consciously challenge their status as 
second class and arc obedient only to God. According to Qu'ranic scripture, men cannot 
claim superiority o\·er women as both sexes are made from the same naft [soul] (Al-
Hibri, 2003). Unlike Judea-Christian traditions, there is no creationism story in which 
male is created before. and therefore considered superior, to female. The only form of 
superiority lies in those who are closest to God by way of their piety (Al-Hibri, 2003). 
These groups of women, all from different backgrounds and with different purpose, are 
finding that one key to empowerment is through worship and service to their community 
(Hafez, 2001). Impossible to ignore, however, is the disconnect between the feminisms of 
the women in Hafez's ethnography and the motivations behind shahida violence. While 
one can hardly say they are like-minded in their endeavors, there is much to be said about 
the social and cultural change they effect. Through shahidas, we can theorize about the 
deconstruction of masculine conceptions of viole~ce and begin to see the shaping of the 
notion of a feminine violence. 
While notions of women and violence cannot be generalized simply from an 
analysis of shahidas (and all shahidas cannot be categorically generalized), patterns of 
contemporary and historical relevance can be derived from the participation of shahidas. 
It is not so important to figure out why shahidas do what they do, but how they came to 
be, how they have changed the world around them - rhetorically and otherwise - and 
what implications they hold cross-culturally for women's participation in certain forms of 
violence. This section has examined notions of wqmen, violence and warfare through 
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news media outlets in the Western and Arab worlds, and has determined that these outlets 
create and regenerate hannful rhetoric that continually distort perceptions of women and 
violence, furthering notions of the docile and nonviolent woman. Next, considerations of 
both history and technology will allow a reconccption of violent women and the future of 
shahidas. 
VJ. Ideology, spirituali.m1, and teclmo/ogy 
The connections between rdigion, spirituality, technology, and the ideology of 
holy war are key components to the "success" of suicide bombing, and this section will 
highlight these inextricable links as they help to cl.arify the ease with which shahide/as 
are indoctrinated. The ri:;c of suicide bombing as a tactic marks a shift in not only 
militaristic but political and personal ideologies of Islamists as well. Bombing as a tactic 
became more common in the mid 1980s with Hczbollah, a Lebanese political and 
military group establishld in opposition to Israel. After Hezbollah's attacks on U.S. 
Marine barracks in Beirut, party members began to discuss turning to bombing as a new 
tactic. Given its success in driving U.S. and Israelis forces out of Le~anon, Iranian 
Muslim leaders later decided to allow the shahides to continue bombing. Although the 
Qu'ran forbids suicide (Brooks, 2002), the other n:rnjor fundamentalist groups caught 
onto shahide training within the following decade, including Hamas (the Islamic 
Resistance Movement), fslamic Jihad, Umar al-Mukhtar Forces, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In 2000, when Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat 
walked out of a peace conference in Camp David after the Israeli prime minister offered 
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social discourse and spirituality. This movement parallels that of the martyrdom 
movements' success due to its adaptability to modern media. Similarly, the technologies 
of the 21st century may have worked to shift Islamists' religious ideology from strict 
adherence to one of sect:lar pragmatism, where television and the camera work to 
reproduce more and more shahidas. In the United States, the advent of the telegraph 
opened up new possibilities for communication with other universes; namely, the dead. 
Shortly after the tekgn:iph came into mainstream use in 1948, Spiritualism as a 
movement took off (Peters, 1999). 
That the telegraph opened access to the spirit world is not a fanciful 
metaphor I am imposing retroactively; the spiritualist haunting of the new 
medium decisi\'ely shaped the popular reception of the technology. 
Spiritualism. the art of communication with the dead, explicitly modeled 
itself on the tclc!:-raph's ability to receive remote messages (p. 94). 
Peters' (1999) historical-critical observation here leaves room to posit about how 
fundamentalism has taken shape in light of the technologies that have come into play 
during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Because women were regarded as more 
sensitive to mediumship and all things spiritual, they were allowed opportunities to 
express agency and to act and speak in public from within this "cultural prestige." The 
beginnings of the struggle for suffrage and women's rights are strongly tied to 
Spritualism as a sort of ··gateway" into the public sphere (Peters, 1999). Spiritualism 
provided nineteenth century women in the U.S. the wherewithal to enter the public as 
participants within at least one sphere of influence, leading to their eventual demand to be 
heard within the political realm. Doubtful, too. that the patriarchs of nineteenth century 
society saw women· s ir.creasecl agency within the Spiritualist movement as an opening 
for the beginning of a women's rights movement. Regardless of whether these patriarchs 
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or even the Spiritualist '"·omen themselves saw this step on the horizon, Peters (1999) 
shows that these technological advances provided an "out" for them to begin their 
advancement into the public. The countless avenues of information and image exchange 
provide a new outlet for shahidas to step into the public sphere as well and into the 
world's public eye. !mares of violent political acts by Muslim women are by no means a 
foreign concept anymore. 
While the future may hold frightening concepts for many, feminist theorist Donna 
Haraway writes on the \\'ays in which technology can help to deconstruct harmful 
binaries and perhaps more fully understand the amalgamation that is the shahida woman. 
As this section has highlighted the 'vays in which news media and other technologies 
have enhanced the effects of suicide bombing as vvell as created the potential for new 
feminist thought and activism within Palestine, Haraway offers ways to use the powers of 
technology for feminist explorations. 
VIL Cyborg theory: Sh:.hidas close the gap between tec/moplwbia and tec/mophilia 
This section will expound upon Donna Haraway's (1991) work, Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women, \\'hich examines the problematic relationship that feminists have 
had historically with technology, claiming that envisioning humans as entirely separate 
from technology leads to damaging binaries. Haraway's work is particularly adaptable to 
the topic of shahida wo1:1en. She argues that theorists often question whether or not 
technological advances are "good" or "bad" for humanity and feminism, creating two 
opposing ideologies that other theorists, writing upon Haraway, describe as 
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"technophobia" and .. technophilia.'· fear or love of technology, respectively (Gray, n.d.). 
Radical feminists, she says, have fallen into a technophobia trap, and Haraway contends 
that this oppositional bir ary must be resisted in order to use and negotiate a conflation of 
humanity and technology. Technology, she claims, is not necessarily unnatural, and 
humans can be organic even when \\e are using computers, machines, mobile phones, 
automobiles, timepieces. etc. (Har<may, 1991 ). 
Haraway ( 1991) writes about cyborg theory in her "Cyborg Manifesto," claiming 
that there is no such thing as an essential, biological femininity, but a forced 
consciousness stemming from histories of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism 
(Haraway, 1991 ). A cyhurg is a being that has lost all sense of essentialist identity as a 
mixture of animal and machine. in which biology and technology have intertwined so 
tightly that they are the same. Cyborgs are a result of a society that" ... marks out a self-
consciously constructed space that cannot affirm the capacity to act on the basis of 
natural identification, but only on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political 
kinship" (Haraway, 1991, p. 156). With this understanding of gender, class and race, 
Haraway writes that her cyborg theory " ... is about transgressed boundaries, potent 
fusions, and dangerous possibilities which [can be explored] as one part of needed 
political work" (Haraway, 1991, p.154). She continues to say that many American 
feminists and socialists think in dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine, 
idealism and materialism in social practices, and that her theory calls for unity between 
those who want to resist domination (Haraway, 1991 ). 11 
Haraway's cyborg theory can be applied to shahidas by examining their current 
social, spiritual, historical, and political context. Radical Islamist restrictions on bodies -
11 See also Cixous, 197 5. 
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women's bodies, in particular - derive from the belief that the feminine form is unclean 
and a distraction to those of men who must perform important duties within the public 
sphere, including worship (Ehlstain. 2003), representing a clear mind/body binary. 
Shahidas are also encouraged to conceptualize Heaven and Hell, leaving the earthly ways 
they know behind and taking the shortest path to paradise, the suicide mission. They must 
endure the pain of the explosion to experience the pleasure of martyrdom. Haraway's 
premises for a cyborg W1>rld do not yet apply for Islamists. but her contention that high-
technology cultures can break down dualisms creates opportunity for shahida women. 
It would be an ethical wrnngdoing to advocate the violence and destruction that 
comes from shahide/a operations. There is no way to rationalize bombing as a method of 
gaining peace or progress in any manner. There is, however, the possibility to 
conceptualize shahidas as cyborgs who arc using technology as a way to communicate 
with the rest of the world with few other means at their disposal. According to Haraway's 
"Cyborg Manifesto" (1909): 
The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. 
It is oppositional. utopian, and ·completely without innocence. No longer 
structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a technological 
polis based partly on the revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. 
(p. 151). 
While Westerners might not consider the Arab world a high-technology culture, there are 
few others that assume a cyborg reality by physically enveloping themselves with 
explosives. A shahida cannot be considered binaried; her. actions are anything but 
innocent, and they defy normalized conventions of femininity in Islamic culture. It was 
Arafat himself that renegotiated women's domesticity, drawing them out of the home 
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when he paralleled their traditional protective duties with that of the prestige of becoming 
a shahida in his ·'army of roses·· speech. 
In a culture nf gender domination. it is easy to see women's participation in these 
attacks as a step towards equality: in fact, it might be so. But there are many other 
nuanced levels to their a.:tivism. While shahidas' violence may seem cruel and evil to us, 
war and bombing from a distance is legitimized through sanitizing language such "War 
on Terrorism" and '"freedom fighting." Perhaps we can ask of Western definitions of 
warfare where accountability for violence comes into play when all efforts are directed at 
attacking an enemy fron~ a distance? Perhaps it is the shahida 'slack of concern over 
death that is the "perversity" that Haraway calls for in the "Cyborg Manifesto" (1999). 
This section discusses the implications of binaried thinking about women and 
technology in an attcmp~ to further deconstruct harmful social norms that infiltrate the 
rhetoric of shahida. Next deconstructing masculine notions of violence and 
reconstructing conceptions of violence as feminine becomes crucial to breaking down 
gendered binaries that bind women to nonviolence. Through three very different 
theorists, the next section will attempt to articulate multiple ways for women to escape 
oppression when the us.: of nonviolence is not available at all times. Lacking any social, 
cultural, or political strw.:ture that allows opportunity for expression and participation for 
women, other means may be necessary for emancipation; or, if not necessary, still a very 
real possibility. 
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VIII. Theories of fe111i11i11e 1•iole11ce, liberatio11, mu/ agency: ways "out" 
Theorists Nancy Fraser. Jeffner Allen, and Helene Cixous each offer differing 
notions about violence. the public sphere, and oppression, respectively. Their works can 
help to provide mon: comprehensive answers to the question ofliberation for women 
living in the absence of democratic structure. Nancy Fraser extends Habermas' notion of 
the "bourgeois"' public sphere and argues that there are multiple, "subaltern" public 
spheres. By understond'.ng shahidas as part of a constant subaltern public of violent 
women rather than a "new" social phenomenon, we can link our analysis even more 
closely to history. Allen· s work. Lesbian Philosophv: Explorations, argues that 
"heterosexual virtue., prevents women from seeking liberation through violent means 
when necessary. Allen's work is useful for distinguishing between feminist and 
masculine structures of violence. creating opportunity for theory that can offer women 
living in oppression a way to claim a feminist vioience. Finally, Helene Cixous offers 
ways in which we can '·do violence" to masculine structures, creating an "out" for 
oppressed women. Colwsively. these sections argue that, although shahida women 
clearly exhibit agency in their decisions to participate in martyrdom operations, the 
structure of suicide bombing is a masculine construction in which women are seen as 
tools. 12 Women's latest debut into the public sphere as shahidas alone cannot liberate 
them. Not only must individual agency come into play, but agency over a movement or 
liberatory effort as a whole must be exhibited as well for women to claim a space of their 
12 Rhetoric that supports this claim can be seen in various popular media articles as well as in more 
scholarly work. Victor (2003) and Zedalis (2004) provide excellent examples of this. See also section V of 
this work. 
own. With the aid of Fraser, Allen. and Cixous. this section will work to offer a few 
ways in which liberation might be achieYctl. 
A. Nancy Fraser. Huher:nas, and "suba!tem publics" 
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The idea of competing public and private spheres can be particularly damaging 
when working through rhetorical processes from a feminist perspective. A better 
understanding of what is often known as the ''private" sphere is necessary, bringing to 
light the importance of i's operations as well as the problems that this binary presents to 
those who are "othcred'' by this rhetoric. Furthermore, crucial to their liberation from 
oppressive Islamist systems, women must be understood to have their own sense of 
violence that ruptures the masculine systems that are oppressive to expressions of 
femininity. Seeking other ways for women to take on responsibility as actors, to claim 
themselves, their actions. and their words as significant contributors to society, promoting 
a freer exchange of scxmlity, of culture, and of ideas is crucial to understanding the idea 
of an entirely female-based public. Through the work of Nancy Fraser, this section will 
argue for a reconceptualization of shahidas as a subaltern public, rather than as renegade 
members of a troubled private sphere of domesticity and passivity. Violent women are 
always already present, and should be analyzed and written about as such. News media 
often figures them as a crazed or dangers to society, regenerating the notion of the docile 
feminine binary. The concept of competing public spheres links analyses of shahida more 
closely with histories of violent women, bringing to light the fact that these women are 
not simply products of modernity. What does that help us with? Counterpublics reconnect 
us with history. 
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Fraser's work "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy" expounds Haberrnas' notion of the public sphere as 
situated among European bourgeois societies. based upon the traditional agora. 
Habermas makes a number of assumptions that lead to construct a public that is the 
public, or one that is bast:d on dominant classed. rnced. and gendered ideology. It consists 
of private bodies entering the pub! ic sphere to discuss items of common interest, before 
retreating into the privak sphere. and assumes that a true democratic society requires a 
sharp split between priYatc interest and civil discourse. Despite Habermas' claim that 
open access to the public sphere is crucial to its function, Fraser draws on other scholars 
to contend that Habermas' sphere depends on exclusion of the irrational and those not 
considered fit for public. namely women and the lower class. Rather than default to the 
trappings of the public \'t.~rsus private binary, Fraser claims that the notion of multiple 
competing publics better captures the complexities of societal structures. For those denied 
access to the dominant, masculine and bourgeois public sphere, subaltern publics take 
shape. Women in these European cities transfigured their categorically "private" 
identities of motherhood and domesticity into a platform for public action (Fraser, 1992, 
p. 115). Despite the lack of a democratic outlet for women before being granted suffrage, 
they still maintained their own publics and continued to alter public space. 
"Thus the view tlrnt women were excluded from the public sphere turns out to be 
ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which 
accepts at face value the bourgeois public's claim to be the public ... On the 
contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of 
competing counter)ublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, 
elite women's publics, and working-class publics" (Fraser, 1992, p. 115-116). 
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Thinking thrnueh this frame, women living in Islamist societies also have their ~ ~ ~ 
own public, despite the oppression that works to restrict not only their activism, but, quite 
literally, their physical bodies as \Yell. Women cannot lead prayer, work, or reveal little 
more than their faces. if that. outside of the home. Certainly, much of the masculine 
ideology at work here centers on keeping women and femininity out of sight. Yet, 
drawing from Fraser, the insurgence of slwhidas is not simply an act of women traversing 
upwards from the depth~ of domesticity into a masculine civil society. It is the mark of a 
comparatively new type of subaltern public, one that is characterized by violence 
originating from women accompanied by more advanced technology and weaponry. It 
competes with the dominant public sphere, altering public discourse about the role of 
women in society as we! I as the nature of warfare. For a culture that is unaccustomed to 
the idea of women participating in society in traditionally masculine ways, how does 
interpublic discourse regarding women and gender change when competing publics are 
confronted with the subalternity of the female suicide bomber? How does she affect her 
cultural surroundings? 13 
Turning again to Fraser to continue this line of questioning, understanding her 
initial introduction of the term "subaltern counterpublics" (Fraser, 1992) is key to 
applying her principles to the case of the female suicide bomber. Discourse is precisely 
what co-defines publics from one another, signaling that they are parallel arenas 
operating within a stratified society or based upon unequal social groups structurally 
13 Technology is not only put to violent use in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but is used in the Muslim 
world for expression and writing as well. In Iraq, blogger "Riverbend," a 26-year-old female computer 
specialist, has received nume ·ous awards for her "girl blog," "Baghdad Burning" (Riverbend), as well as 
the UK's Samuel Johnson Prize for non-fiction for a print version of her online journal. The Internet is 
quickly becoming yet another technological "out" for women in the public sphere, even as it continues to 
perpetuate patriarchal structures of information and capitalism. 
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related by dominance and subordination. Within these stratified societies, those living in 
subordination find it advantageous and liberatory to constitute these counterpublics. 
" ... Members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities. interests, and needs" (Fraser, 
1992, p. 123). She exemplifies the late twentieth century U.S. feminist counterpublic, but 
shahidas can easily be similarly constituted within this framework. These groups emerge, 
some with decided consciousness and others without, in response to marginalization and 
exclusion from dominant publics. In effect, then, discursive exchange is immediately 
altered and assumptions that were previously invisible from public view are forced into 
discussions. "In general.'' she says, "the proliferation of subaltern counterpublics means a 
widening of discursive contestation, and that is a good thing in stratified societies" 
(Fraser, 1992, p. 124 ). 
Shahidas have exactly this effect on their respective cultures. Suddenly they are 
granted their own category within popular media, and the names of women that have 
completed their missions garner celebrity, in spite of many men that have done the same. 
There is no escaping their discursive presence. So, true to form, we have a myriad of 
publics examining them. probing for meaning, looking for motives, and desperately 
seeking an explanation for these women. They are anomalies, outcasts, empowered, 
oppressed, crazy, and d<rngerous, all simultaneously, within and between parallel 
discursive circles. Now the pregnant woman, onct:'. a life-giving entity, is feared and 
suspect in Muslim societies. The female body is to be covered and hidden from public 
view, considered dirty and dangerous for pious men who must remain concentrated on 
their faith. Now she is catapulted into public view in a very different way, and her body is 
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under (in) attack like nc,·er before-it is both subject and object. and it is never safe for 
or safe from anyone or anything. Whatever they arc to whichever public is less relevant 
than the pervasiveness of the discourse that surrounds their actions. As a subaltern 
counterpublic, they actiYely effect change and force those around them to seek their own 
questions and answers. 
B. Jeffner Allen and a "lesbian" ''iolence 
The shahida"s violent socio-political participation is a sign of progress in a 
society that traditionally relegates her to the household. Just as the Islamic feminists in 
Hafez's (2001) ethnography arc using their faith as vehicles for agency and liberation 
from certain patriarchal conceptions of Islam, this nonviolent method of breaking through 
subjectivity is not sufficient for Jcffner Allen, who contends that many feminist 
movements focus entirely on maintaining a nonviolent status at whatever cost as opposed 
to the creation of liberation. She suggests that putting a commitment to nonviolence 
above freedom promotes an aversion to killing stronger than a woman's own will to live, 
abducting her from true feminist concerns. She notes "heterosexual virtue" is the very 
cornerstone that binds women to male-defined nonviolence (Allen, 1991 ). 
Adherents to the ideology of heterosexual virtue hold in common the claim that 
violence is brutalizing. Women are held to be better than men, either wholly or in 
part, precisely because women are nonviolent. .. The heterosexual virtue which 
binds women to male-defined nonviolence is preeminently self-destructive, leading 
to the sole form o:· action permittl.!d to women: martyrdom and suicide. To accept 
the patriarchal construct of nonviolence vs. violence is to side with men's 
terrorization of women and against women, its avoiders, resisters, and fervent 
opponents (Allen 1991, p. 61 ). 
Current discourse over female bombers is limiting as women are discussed as either 
violent victims in a patriarchal context or nonviolent in a feminist context. Nonviolence is 
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a patriarchal construct assigned to women, who are essentialized as naturally docile, 
motherly and weak; to b·~ masculine is violent, strong, unfeeling. Allen proposes a form 
of "lesbian-based" violence that is defined by women, one that deconstructs, reconstructs, 
and reclaims a violence characterized by female strength, harmony and love. Recognizing 
that even though slwhidus (and slwhides) place their desire for freedom above their own 
lives as Allen says \\omen should when challenging patriarchy, they continue to 
subscribe to a male-defined violence that pits them in an ethnic binary against women of 
other cultures that suffer similarly. This state of "anti-sisterhood," as Dworkin (n.d.) puts 
it, is a guise for nationalist liberation. While women strive to prove themselves as worthy 
in a world of violent masculinity, they are simultaneously pitted against one another in 
competition for purity r:nd holiness as martyrs. Their bodies are controlled by male 
handlers, who strap them with explosives, instruct· them on how and when to detonate 
themselves, and send them off to achieve a masculine Islamist "liberation." 
A patriarchal conception of violence does not encompass that which empowers 
and unifies women. Instead, it is a form of Allen's lesbian violence as it deconstructs the 
frail, decorative and nonviolent heterosexual female in lieu of a freeing subjectivity that 
rejects the passivity of the female body. This violence would reject the same subjectivity 
that is incurred upon female bombers in the Islamist movement. The rhetoric of 
distinction between male and female violent actors is nearly obligatory in our media, and 
the placement of "female" before "suicide bomber" as a modifier insinuates a forced 
subjectivity that does violence to women's bodies and agency. It reinforces the 
patriarchal construct of violence that Allen describes; the very mention of the sex of the 
bomber insinuates she is a deviant body, an anomaly deserving concern, fear, and 
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management. This rhetoric does not consider or even allow for the possibility of a violent 
woman. She is categori,~ally denied the opportunity to express her agency, to inscribe the 
genealogy, despite its patriarchal context, of her becoming an historical and cultural actor 
(Dworkin, n.d.). Women have always been violent, yet patriarchy defines away their 
actions as either outside some male conception of "true" violence or deviant in some way 
that masculinizes the female actor. 
So what of slwhidas? The violence they incur is part of a terrorist struggle for 
nationalist liberation. but its meaning for women is steeped under layers of rhetoric 
belying bodily self-sacrifice in the name of God and faith. The violent institution of 
bombing is created by men, reinforcing patriarchy by objectifying women's bodies as 
available for "use" and exploitation, erasing any rhetorical means for their own agency 
and forcing them into pJssivity as a "discovery" made by terrorist organizations. These 
women should be reconceptualized in order to rupture the ways in which violence is 
constructed to reinforce patriarchy by objectifying women's bodies as weaponry, 
dismissing agency, and forcing passivity. Women have for ages proven themselves 
capable of male-defined violence, as well as violence that challenges patriarchal 
hegemony. We have only to create a rhetorical space and new subject-position for 
women, opening new avenues for self-generated agency. Breaking the meaning of 
violence free from patriarchal meaning is the key to creating a potential space for an 
empowering violence for women. 
In contrast, the lslamic feminists in Sharine Hafez's (2001) ethnographical story 
work and live according to Qu'ranic scripture mandating peace and nonviolence. 
Simultaneously, however, they create violence against patriarchal constructs of feminine 
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obedience and weakness by creating their own communities, providing childcare for one 
another, teaching women skills they need to enter the workforce, or engaging in prayer 
together (Haf ez, 200 I). They actively create rhetorical space for themselves, placing their 
interests and concerns as a social priority and claiming subjective freedom through their 
devotion to God. They challenge masculine hegemonic rule not in an organized 
movement against patriarchy. but by redefining woman's space in society and engaging 
in the creation of community. 
Allen's theory does not provide sufficient answers for women living in a society 
without some form of political structure that allows them space for public expression. 
How are women to act out in a way that disrupts the systems that serve to destroy them? 
As minority figures within oppressive political and social regimes, their movements are 
restricted and policed heavily, an attempt by a dominant public sphere to erase them from 
view. They are banished into invisibility from "civil" society. We cannot ignore that they 
continue to exist within the dominant public sphere, even as their physical bodies are 
heavily restricted. Shahidas are considered social anomalies, women who traverse the 
boundaries from the private sphere into the public, supposedly seeking death, freedom, 
martyrdom, or an escape from their lives. The notion of the private sphere here carries 
with it implications of oppression and darkness, a place from which women must escape 
to seek agency and liberation. Next, Helene Cixous expounds on both Fraser's and 
Allen's works by offering one method of feminine liberation; the violence of writing as a 
way to break free from oppression. Perhaps shahidas offer Cixous' theory a new angle, 
one of"bodily writing." 
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C. From Cixous · "11'/"iling out" to the "bodily writing" of the shahida 
Although both Fraser and Cixous proffer ways to effect meaningful societal 
change, this cannot occur without some form of purposefulness behind the actions of 
those who wish to create such change. Without understanding the agency behind these 
actions, the violence that shahidas create is little more than a product of the dominant 
public. These seemingly incredible acts of defiance to an ancient moral code that denies 
agency to women is not without the threat of strong consequence. Crucial to women's 
liberation from such oppressive societies is a conception of their own sense of violence 
that cannot be defined as phallic. Now we must move forward from Fraser and seek other 
ways for women to alter public space and take on responsibility as actors. Helene Cixous 
offers one way of doing this which incorporates a non-traditional definition of 
"violence." In her work "Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays" (Cixous 1975), 
she claims writing as a way of escaping a dangerous and harmful "economy of the 
Selfsame" and promoting a feminine economy. Her writing is purposefully violent, and 
she uses it to rupture the oppressive binaries of her own environment, as a woman of 
many minorities growing up in imperialist Algeria. It is an order of discourse that divides 
whole societies and cultures, thereby rejecting half and assuming a systemic relationship 
characterized by domination and subordination. One of the ways that she uses her violent 
writing is to shock the reader out of complacency over cultures of domination, writing 
her way out of the binaries of imperialistic thought as, Fraser might argue, a member of a 
subaltern counterpublic. Cixous is radical and unapologetic in her writing, doing violence 
to the social stratification she understood as an adolescent, victimized by imperialism, 
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sexism, and racism. Her writing is a democratic move from within a grossly 
undemocratic society. 
Westerners may take for granted. however, the pre-existing democratic, political 
. ' 
and social structures that allow for writing oneself out. Considering the uniqueness of the 
Islamic woman's experience from that of Western, Judea-Christian backgrounds, it is 
useful to introduce and employ here the rhetorical concept of Robert Craig's "caravan." 
He presents the caravan in an effort towards converging more wholly the fields of 
rhetoric and science, utilizing it in order to weaken a pervasive binary that has worked 
against the furthering of communicative studies. Perhaps this concept can be useful here 
also, to bring together the experiences of oppression of Judea-Christian women and 
Muslim women. Certainly, the result of their sociql and political situations can each be 
attributed, in part, to religious extremism. In this way, they are subaltern counterpublics, 
both struggling against a dominant and oppressive public. Women living in societies such 
as Cixous' as well as those of the female bombers must create their own democratic 
discourse, one that can be made more powerful through this caravan of interpublic 
exchange. While Cixous gains this agency through physical writing, shahidas also 
"write," but in a very different way. They write through and write with their bodies, 
taking this notion of violence quite literally. Their bodies are their voice; they explode, 
true to Cixous. With no form of pre-existing democratic structure whatsoever, this 
violence must take place in order for them to create space for their bodies to speak in 
such a way. 
But the questioc remains; what are they writing? What kind of mark are they 
leaving behind for future bombers to read before recording their own voices upon 
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history? There is a multiplicity of possibilities-each woman's event leaves traces of 
stories behind her. leaving us with questions of "why ... ?" The value of Fraser's work 
appears again here, and while it is possible to entertain the idea of common threads 
among these women. it is also essential to understand that each bombing will constitute 
its own signature upon society, with its own contexts and meanings. They are the writings 
of subaltern counterpublics, working against what Cixous names the "empire of the 
Selfame" (Cixous, 1975, p. 70), and against the bi!1aries of self/other. "If there is a self 
proper to woman, paradoxically it is her capacity to depropriate herself without self-
interest: endless body, without 'end', without principal 'parts' ... " (Cixous, 1975, p. 87). 
The notion of the "endl~ss body" is particularly applicable to women suicide bombers; 
their bodies are forever catapulted among discourse, forever in memory. Here she 
commits to the bodily essences of writing one's way out of categories, shattering the 
mind/body binary by uniting them as inseparable. This dilemma is played out quite 
clearly in the media's struggle to categorize these women. The suicide bomber writes of 
violence through violence on all levels-violence .through wars between pre-existing 
nation-states and through wars that occur inter- and intra-publicly, between genders, 
classes, and races. Their bodily explosions are the ultimate mode of feminine expression. 
Through "writing" in this sense we understand female suicide bombing to be an 
inscription or imprint c:uite literally, on society and social memory. These actions can be 
read through political, social, and cultural implications, thereby reinforcing the agency 
behind their actions and understanding each event within its own particular context. 
Suicide bombers, like other historically violent subaltern counterpublics, manipulate the 
tools they have immediately before them, regardless of what they are. As Cixous finds 
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"ways out" of harmful binaries by violent writing, so do bombers, who write through 
their bodies as their dominant publics work otherwise to suppress their voices. They 
bomb because they cannot write as Cixous does, but their effects on social discourse 
mirror one another. Through Fraser's framework, we can understand their actions as 
democratic moves within a context that works to suppress democratic activity. Yet, their 
physical violence docs violence to the pre-existing social stratification that is so pervasive 
and tyrannical, catapulting them into competing counterpublics, altering public space and 
ultimately setting socia;, political and cultural discourse on a trajectory that can never 
regress. Through these writings, shahidas can be· understood not as passive products of 
their time, but as a rising historical category of women who alter their worlds through 
deliberate moves to liberate themselves from within a social structure designed for 
oppression and domination. Women can "write" through a variety of mediums; writing in 
this sense can be quite literal or figurative. Perhaps considering the shahida as a writer of 
her own kind can help increase understanding about how violence and the technologies of 
warfare mark society and even provide an "out" for women. 
Through Allen. Fraser, and Cixous this section has considered a number of ways 
to create violence that can be defined as feminine in nature, thus deconstructing harmful 
binaries that associate women with passivity and nonviolence. If shahida women are 
truly seeking an "out'" from a masculine oppression, there are ways in which this can be 
accomplished through ownership of a violence generated by women, rather than warfare 
tactics created by masculine extremists. 
Co11clusio11 
The rnbject tliut emerges from this unnameable point of division is a split subject, 
identij}>ing its prerious, fragmenlmJ' experience which only "exists" as ajfect-
bare want, loss that is unrepresenrable-with the mother's body. Before desire-
the 111ove111e11t olll from a self to the obiects on which it is directed-there are 
drives that illl'olve preoedipal semiotic fimctions and energy discharges that 
connect and orient the hody to the mother. Abjection is the moment of separation, 
the border be111'ce11 the "!"and the other, before an "!"is formed; it is want itself-
an unassimilah/e nonunity experienced by one who is neither in the symbolic order 
nor outside of ii, 
Birmingham (on Arendt), 2003 
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Through the eigl1t sections of this paper, discussion over how shahida rhetoric is 
shaped and disseminated throughout the world by various news media outlets has lead to 
further analysis over the veracity behind this rhetoric and how shahidas figure differently 
in considering notions of women, gender and violence when history is taken into account. 
Using Yasser Arafat's '"army of roses" speech from 2002 as a benchmark rhetorical event 
for analyses over the feminization of Palestinian jihad on Israel, developing popular and 
scholarly perceptions oCshahida women were explored during a review of shahida 
literature. In the follow:ng two sections, the news media's effect on social knowledge of 
women was discussed, and the lack of historical context was critiqued as a central to 
understanding women and violence. A closer look at possibilities behind shahida 
motivations was then considered. Significantly, efforts to generalize about why women 
participate - be it through desperation, nationalism, or indoctrination - are avoided as 
both men and women have a diversity ~f motivations behind their actions, many of which 
can never be discovered. Reflecting next on how Peters (1999) closely links the U.S.'s 
spiritualism movement of the late 18th and early 19th centuries to the beginning of the 
women's movement. so too can we consider that perhaps, despite the violence of suicide 
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bombing, Arafat's call to arms inadvertently may have sparked new ideas about the 
participation of women in civic life, an entry into the public sphere upon a new avenue. 
This entry is also inextricably linked to the role of technology in broadcasting suicide 
bombing events to the world and providing an outlet for the creation and profligation of 
cultural norms involving women and their participation in warfare. Donna Haraway's 
"Cyborg Manifesto" ( 1 999) helps to allay fears of technology as a source of violence and 
constructs the notion that although modern technology is crucial to creation of new 
shahide/as, it can also be crucial to liberation as a method of expression and agency for 
women. Finally. the works of Fraser (1992). Allen (1991 ), and Cixous (1975) together 
help to distinguish between structures of violence that are useful for liberation and those 
that are harmful. as \\'cl I as offer alternative ways of "doing violence." 
One of the most significant ways that shahidas operate is through the media -
they exploit it to contin·.1e reproducing other operatives, while simultaneously Western 
media exploits them to negotiate ideology about gender, warfare, and violence. Arafat's 
"army of roses" speech has forever changed the idea of domesticity in Islamic culture -
by proclaiming that men and women are equal, what now of the role of women in the 
home? 
Understnnding discourse surrounding fem~le martyrs reveals the ways in which 
both Western and Islnmic societies consider gender and spirituality. Shifting ideological 
and religious beliefs have in part been influenced by the ability of technology and the 
mass media to disseminate imagery and rhetorical devices to worldwide audiences, 
allowing Westerners th·~ opportunity to see first-hand the faces of those who have chosen 
to become martyrs nnd hear the stories of the aftermath of the violence. Perhaps this is 
part of what makes suicide bombing so effective- the global transmissions of images, 
information, sound, and words that are so ugly that, thanks to pervasive media 
technologies, we cannot help but look. 
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The fascination with shahidas in particular indicates that their behavior is 
considered deviant and abnormal by Westeni standards, whereas shahides have now 
become passe. Male violence is normalized, while traditionalist ideas of the non-violent 
female alarm and shock society. Shahidas are looked upon as a sign of a crazed society 
gone wrong, while \Vcsterners fail to turn the critical gaze upon themselves. Rarely are 
these women understood as thinking beings acting with reason, empowerment, and 
choice. Western culture is fearful of considering these possibilities, for if these women 
were acting rationally, then the possibilities of feminine violence can be recognized as 
normal. What, then, of state violence? If shahidas are acting rationally, then how can we 
characterize Western tactics of distanced warfare? 
The Western news media provides a Iimit~d and blinding framework for 
understanding a culture of martyrdom and the ways in which the Muslim countries 
conceive of life and death, gender, and nation. Simultaneously, media systems reflect 
upon how Western culture conceives of these same issues, doing no justice to their 
subjects and to their audiences. Media incapacitates its audience from considering 
alternatives to what is presented over the Internet and on television. A participatory move 
must be made in order to combat harmful dualistic thinking about race, class and gender, 
so that.shahidas can be understood outside of passive products of their time. Haraway's 
(1991) Cyborg Man if es to is one way to escape dualistic thinking and understand the 
ways in which technology has influenced this generation's choices in violence in the 
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name of liberation. Not.only does rapid information exchange work to reproduce and feed 
shahide/a cultur~, it brcught about its use during a time when spirituality has never been 
more closely linked to the technologies created by our species. True to Haraway, media 
are technologies that shape our social, historical, and political realities, just as we shape 
them. What do writings like those of Applebaum (2002), Barr (2002) and Davis (2004) 
say about Western culture? What are "mainstream" ideas of how violence and gender 
link? In order to understand the world around us, our media systems must be broader in 
scope, and discourse analysis is crucial to grasping the ideology of this social 
phenomenon. 
The aim of this essay is to "complicate" the rhetorical world of shahida women. 
News media's greatest injustice to these women is the purposeful framing of such 
rhetoric as a brand new ahistorical category, which detrimentally regenerates the 
perception of women as nonviolent when, in fact, women have always been both violent 
and nonviolent. Through "complication," we consider this multi-faceted issue of 
violence, oppression, gender and warfare, rather than creating exercises in futility by 
trying to "get inside" the motivations of these women. Shahidas' agency can be 
generalized .no more than their male counterparts, and they must be respected as 
independent, thinking actors rather than impotent,' docile and brainwashed victims. 
This work offers neither solutions nor answers to any of the questions posited. It 
is impossible to write about shahidas in the West without inserting values, privilege, and 
bias into one's work, and here, there is no aim to write out of or in spite of the Western 
perspective. One canno: "figure out" or und.;:rstand religious jihad and its associated 
violence without lived experience. This work only offers suggestions on how to better 
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analyze women, gender and violence through the case study of the Palestinian shahidas 
in order to deconstruct the rhetorical assumptions Western news media has deferred onto 
these women. Perhaps by reconceptualizing much of the binaried thinking and writing 
created - by both scholars and by members of the news media - we can better theorize 
about cultural conflict and the use of violence for terrorizing. Doubtful, however, that 
finding an end to violence by shahides and shahidas will come from the West; answers to 
this problem can only come from those who live and know the cultural weight with 
which ideology, spirituality, and religion operate. Regardless, there is much the West can 
do to end dualistic thinking and examine its own cultural notions about violence, warfare 
and women. Arguments about violence, technology, agency, and spirituality would be 
incomplete without considering the impacts of shahidas on their global audience. 
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